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1. INTRODUCTION
How responsive is aggregate labour supply to changes in the economic environment? While
the answer to this question is crucial for understanding the effects of government policies and
business cycles, it has led to substantial debate in the economics profession. At the core of this
debate is the inconsistency between the small labour supply elasticities for men estimated in micro-
studies and the large ones used in macro-models. The empirical evidence indicates that aggregate
labour supply responses are determined by individual responses along both the intensive and the
extensive margins.1 While the consensus in the micro-literature is that the extensive margin, at
1. See Cooley (1995) for evidence on the adjustment in labour supply along both margins over the business cycle
and Blundell et al. (2011) for recent evidence on the importance of both margins over time in the U.S., the U.K., and
France.
the annual level, is not important for understanding labour supply responses of males, the key
idea motivating our article is that individuals frequently use the extensive margin to adjust their
labour supply within a year. Although once aggregated to the annual level these labour supply
responses are not prominent, we argue that ﬂuctuations in employment within a year are important
for understanding labour supply responses.
Furthermore, our article builds on the idea that a rich theory of heterogeneity is needed
for studying how the extensive margin matters for aggregate labour supply responses. Economic
theory implies that labour supply responses along the intensive and extensive margins are distinct
objects. The intensive margin responses are mainly driven by the intertemporal substitution of
labour (the Frisch elasticity of labour supply). The extensive margin responses, on the other hand,
are unrelated to the preference parameter typically estimated in micro-studies. Chang and Kim
(2006) build on the insights from the model of indivisible labour in Hansen (1985) and Rogerson
(1988), introduce heterogeneity, and show that the slope of the aggregate labour supply schedule
is determined by the distribution of reservation wages rather than by the willingness to substitute
leisure intertemporally, establishing that when the extensive margin is operative heterogeneity
and aggregation play a crucial role in determining aggregate labour supply responses. Therefore,
we build a life-cycle model with heterogeneous agents making labour supply decisions, both
along the intensive and extensive margins, at subannual periods. This rich in heterogeneity model
provides an aggregation theory of individual labour supply that is ﬁrmly grounded on individual-
level micro-evidence and is used to study aggregate labour supply responses and the importance
of the responses along the extensive margin.
We discipline our theory with a large number of facts on labour supply at the individual
level documented on data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Most importantly, the SIPP data reveal a quite operative
extensive margin at high frequencies, such as four-month periods referred to as quadrimesters: the
probability of entering non-employment is high, most non-employment spells are short-lived, and
this pattern is observed at all stages of the life cycle. Thus, individuals frequently use the extensive
margin to adjust their labour supply within a year, even at old ages. Capturing this pattern is central
to the analysis in this article, and we ﬁnd that it is essential for understanding labour supply
responses. In addition, the PSID data reveal another insightful pattern: there are large differences
in lifetime labour supply across individuals, even conditional on education and permanent income,
implying that preference heterogeneity is an important factor for understanding the variation in
labour supply across individuals.
We incorporate into the theoretical framework several key features that allow for an operative
extensive margin of labour supply. The evidence indicates that workers rarely choose to work
small number of hours, an observation that has motivated Cogan (2001) to model ﬁxed costs of
work. Moreover, there is also evidence that earnings are a convex (non-linear) function of hours
of work which also provides a rationale for workers not to choose short hours (Mofﬁtt, 1984;
Gustman and Steinmeier, 1985, 1986; Keane and Wolpin, 2001; Aaronson and French, 2004).
Our model incorporates both ﬁxed costs of work and non-linear earnings, which are arguably the
two main approaches in the literature to model the extensive margin. By combining these two
approaches, we are able to show that there is a complementarity between ﬁxed costs of work
and non-linear earnings that enhances extensive-margin labour supply responses. The calibration
implies that individuals face substantial ﬁxed costs of work, non-linear earnings, a job ﬁnding rate
of less than one when non-employed and that there is signiﬁcant preference heterogeneity in the
taste for leisure. All of these features are needed for the model to be consistent with the following
moments: (1) the age-proﬁle of employment rates, (2) the probability of transitioning from
employment to non-employment at various stages in the life cycle, (3) the duration distribution
of non-employment spells, and (4) the lifetime inequality in labour supply. Thus, our calibration
strategy ensures that the theory is consistent with the incidence and volatility of non-employment
spells and the lifetime dispersion in labour supply—an important step in the development of a
quantitative theory of labour supply responses.
We ﬁnd that the aggregate labour supply elasticity to a one period unanticipated small wage
change in the baseline economy is 1.75, with an extensive margin elasticity of 1.08 (about 62%
of the aggregate labour supply response) and an intensive margin elasticity of 0.67. The empirical
literature on labour supply has provided a broad set of estimates for the intertemporal elasticity
of labour supply along the intensive margin. The implications of our theory are consistent with
the ﬁndings in this literature.2 Furthermore, we stress that the intertemporal elasticity in our
model economy is computed from an ideal experiment for which there is no clear counterpart
in the data: we simulate a one period small (purely) unanticipated wage change and compute
aggregate labour supply responses to measure the intertemporal elasticity of labour supply. When
we measure the intertemporal response using conventional empirical methods on the model
simulated individual-level data, we ﬁnd much smaller estimates of the Frisch elasticity of labour
supply.3
Through a series of experiments aimed at assessing the importance of various modelling
assumptions, we conclude that even though the intensive-margin elasticity of aggregate labour
supply is quantitatively important, it is almost invariant to changes in the modelling assumptions.
The effects of the modelling assumptions on labour supply responses are almost entirely driven
by their impact on the extensive margin. When we shut down the non-linear earnings feature in
the baseline economy and simulate the employment responses to a small temporary wage change,
we ﬁnd that the ﬁxed costs of work in the baseline economy are sufﬁciently small that, on their
own, they do not affect employment decisions along the extensive margin. However, ﬁxed costs
of work matter importantly in the presence of non-linear earnings, accounting for half of the
employment response in our baseline economy: when we shut down ﬁxed costs of work in the
baseline economy, the extensive margin elasticity to a temporary wage change drops from 1.08
to 0.57. This result underscores that there is a complementarity between ﬁxed costs of work and
non-linear earnings that enhances the aggregate labour supply response to a temporary wage
change. We also ﬁnd that the extensive margin is also crucial for understanding how the labour
supply response to a temporary wage change varies across age and education groups. The age
proﬁle of the labour supply response in the baseline economy is U shaped. Such a life-cycle
pattern is reminiscent of the fact that over the business cycle hours of work and employment
ﬂuctuate much more for young and old individuals than for the middle-aged, as discussed in
Gomme et al. (2005) and Jaimovich and Siu (2009).
Economists assessing the effects of tax policies are interested in estimates of the labour supply
response to a permanent (compensated) wage change, as measured by the Hicks elasticity of
labour supply. The implicit assumption is that tax revenues are rebated back to the representative
consumer so that wage (or tax) changes do not have wealth effects. We ﬁnd that the Hicks
elasticity of aggregate labour supply in the baseline economy is 0.44, which is in line with
estimates in the micro-literature.4 Our ﬁndings suggest that modelling the extensive margin is
2. Keane (2011) surveys 21 of the best known studies that estimate the (Frisch) elasticity of labour supply at the
intensive margin, and reports a mean value from the surveyed studies of 0.83. Chetty et al. (2011a), in their meta study
of 25 papers report a mean value of 0.54 for the (intensive margin) Frisch elasticity of labour supply.
3. The estimates vary substantially depending on the instrument used in the log-hours-log-wage regression
(empirical) analysis. Allowing for some measurement error in hours/wages further decrease the estimated elasticities.
The fact that the conventional empirical methods lead to estimates that are lower than the elasticity obtained with our
ideal macro-experiment is consistent with the views discussed in Keane (2011) and Keane and Rogerson (2012).
4. Keane (2011) surveys 21 studies of the Hicks elasticity of males and reports a mean value of 0.30. The mean
value of the Hicks elasticity of aggregate hours across the micro-studies reviewed in Chetty et al. (2011a) is 0.59, with
important for an accurate assessment of aggregate labour supply responses to wage (tax) changes
and how these responses vary with age. This is because the labour supply responses along the
intensive and extensive margins have different signs. While the intensive margin elasticity is
0.55, the extensive margin elasticity is −0.11. Hence, neglecting the extensive margin response
will signiﬁcantly overstate the aggregate labour supply response to a (compensated) wage (tax)
change.5 The magnitude of this bias varies across ages, and it is largest late in the life cycle.6
Keane (2011) and Keane and Rogerson (2011, 2012) advocate the importance of a research
programme that studies how the features studied in our model (e.g. life cycle, incomplete markets,
preference heterogeneity, non-linear earnings, and the extensive margin) jointly affect labour
supply responses. We emphasize that most of the papers in the macro-literature do not model
the labour supply decisions of males along the extensive margin (see, for instance, Low, 2005;
Domeij and Flodén, 2006; Pijoan-Mas, 2006). It is noteworthy that Keane’s (2011) discussion of
the literature on labour supply along the extensive margin refers mostly to females. All of the
structural papers he discussed refer to female labour force participation, and they typically use a
model period of one year. Perhaps the closest paper to us is French (2005), who incorporates most
of the features in our article but models the extensive margin at an annual level because he is mostly
interested in studying retirement decisions late in the life cycle.7 Finally, our framework abstracts
from human capital accumulation, a feature that Imai and Keane (2004) and Keane (2011) have
emphasized. Instead, our analysis focuses on different, but complementary, mechanisms.
2. EMPIRICAL FACTS
In this section, we describe the facts on male labour supply over the life cycle, lifetime labour
supply, and evidence on non-linear earnings that guide the development of our theory.
2.1. Labour supply over the life cycle
We begin our empirical analysis by describing facts on labour supply at the extensive (whether to
work or not) and intensive (how much to work) margins. The distinction between the extensive
and intensive margins of labour supply depends on the period of time. In our analysis, we will
use data from the SIPP, and we will deﬁne the time period to be four months (a quadrimester),
substantial variation in the estimated elasticities across studies. Since there are wide conﬁdence intervals associated with
each of the point estimates as well as methodological disputes about the validity of some of the studies, Chetty et al.
(2011a) argue that the estimates should be treated as rough values meant to gauge the order of magnitudes. In this sense,
the Hicks elasticity implied by our model appears reasonable.
5. Hours along the intensive margin decrease because of the substitution effect associated with the lower wage
rate. On the other hand, the decrease in the (compensated) wage discourages savings over the life cycle, which, in turn,
leads to an important increase of the employment rate at old age. This effect accounts for the aggregate negative elasticity
of labour supply along the extensive margin.
6. While the Hicks elasticity along the intensive margin is ﬂat over the life cycle, the extensive margin elasticity
varies importantly with age. The extensive-margin elasticity for non-college and college individuals aged 55–61 is −0.42
and −0.35. The corresponding values for the age group 25–34 are −0.07 and −0.05 for non-college and college individuals
(i.e. about a ﬁfth of those of the oldest age group).
7. Chang and Kim (2006) and Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) are also two well-known papers in the macro-
literature that model the extensive margin. The former abstracts from labour supply decisions along the intensive margin,
and they do not model preference heterogeneity, life cycle, and tied wage offers (non-linear earnings). Relative to
Rogerson and Wallenius (2009), our contribution is to build a theory of aggregation, disciplined with micro-data, with
several dimensions of heterogeneity (skills and tastes). Moreover, by modelling non-linear earnings together with ﬁxed
costs of work, we can focus on how these two features interact in determining labour supply responses along the extensive
margin.
implying that variation in labour supply within a quadrimester period is interpreted as changes
along the intensive margin while variation in the number of quadrimesters worked would be
interpreted as changes in labour supply along the extensive margin.
The SIPP interviews individuals three times a year (once every four months) and provides
detailed monthly information on labour market history and income and welfare programme
participation. We use this information in oder to compute labour market statistics of interest at a
high frequency, such as a quadrimester. We use the 1990 SIPP Panel which runs from October
1989 until August 1992. That implies that it spans 8 quadrimesters (32 months).8 We restrict the
analysis only to men, who are not self-employed, between the ages of 25 and 61. Individuals are
classiﬁed as non-college if they have either elementary or high school education and as college
if they report having completed college education.
Deﬁnition of employment and non-employment. In order to classify an individual as either
employed or non-employed in a particular quadrimester, we utilize the available information in
the SIPP on hours worked at the monthly level.
First, we identify whether an individual in a particular month is: (1) working (i.e. reporting
positive hours worked), (2) not working (i.e. reporting zero hours worked), or (3) a non-
respondent, not in the sample. Only months with information about working (i.e. either (1)
or (2)) can be used in the analysis. Individuals who work as self-employed in a given month fall
into category (3) in that particular month. Secondly, if an individual works in one or more months
in a given quadrimester, regardless of whether the remaining months fall into categories (2) or (3),
then he is classiﬁed as employed in that quadrimester. If an individual falls into category (2)—i.e.
reporting zero hours worked—in each of the four months in a quadrimester, then he is classiﬁed as
non-employed. All other individuals are dropped from the sample for that quadrimester. Finally,
a non-employment spell starts whenever an individual is working in one quadrimester and not
in the next one. The non-employment spell ends when the individual records a quadrimester of
employment.
In order to discuss life-cycle patterns, below we group individuals in four age groups: 25–34,
35–44, 45–54, and 55–61.
Employment rate and mean hours of work. The quadrimesterly employment rates and mean
hours of work by age and education groups are reported in Figures 6 and 9 in the calibration section.
The employment patterns are not surprising: college individuals have a higher employment rate,
at all ages, than non-college individuals, and there is a pronounced decline in the employment
rates late in the life cycle.9 Average hours worked are higher for college individuals, and mean
hours worked decrease late in the life cycle for both education groups. This is due to both lower
employment rates and lower hours per worker, although the extensive margin is quantitatively
much more important.
Entry into non-employment spells. Figure 1 reports the fraction of those entering a non-
employment spell, by age and education groups. Non-college individuals are much more likely
to enter a non-employment spell, and that fraction increases late in the life cycle. Recall that
8. We recomputed all of the empirical facts reported below on the 1993 SIPP data that run from October 1992
until December 1995. The facts are very similar in both SIPP data sets.
9. Note that measures of employment that use information on hours worked in the week preceding the interview
will produce slightly lower employment rates than our deﬁnition of employment.
Figure 1
Entry rate into non-employment, 1990 SIPP.
Notes: The entry rate into non-employment is measured as the fraction of those employed in quadrimester t that are
non-employed in quadrimester t+1.
individuals are classiﬁed as non-employed if they do not work at all throughout the whole four-
month period. Therefore, those who use the extensive margin not to work spend a non-trivial
amount of time non-employed. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd very large entry rates into non-employment,
at all ages of the life cycle, indicating that individuals consistently use the extensive margin in
order to adjust their labour supply: throughout most of the life cycle around 4% (2%) of the
employed non-college (college) individuals will ﬁnd themselves non-employed in the following
quadrimester. These numbers increase to 6% and 4% late in the life cycle for the non-college and
the college, respectively.
We use SIPP data on transitions from employment into unemployment in order to differentiate
labour market transitions out of employment that might be due to involuntary separations. In
order to analyse entry into unemployment, we focus on those individuals who report to have
been employed in the previous quadrimester, but are classiﬁed as non-employed in the current
quadrimester according to the criteria speciﬁed above. We then use three variables from the
1990 SIPP to identify the subset of individuals from the group of non-employed who are
unemployed: (1) number of weeks looking for work, (2) employment status recode for each
month, and (3) amount of unemployment compensation and beneﬁts. We consider an individual
to be unemployed if he spent any positive time looking for a job or received unemployment
beneﬁts and compensation. The resulting quadrimesterly entry rates into unemployment are, as
expected, higher for non-college than college individuals. Moreover, for both education groups
they are fairly stable over the life cycle: 2.4% for non-college and 1.16% for college. Hence, our
Figure 2
Non-employment spells, 1990 SIPP.
ﬁndings suggest that about half of the non-employment spells are voluntary. Nonetheless, it is
plausible that these estimates underestimate the amount of voluntary separations in the data for
two reasons. First, we consider an individual to be non-employed only if the non-employment spell
lasts for at least four months, thereby not capturing short non-employment spells. Secondly, our
procedure most likely underestimates voluntary separations because an individual who voluntarily
separates from a job in a given quadrimester and searches for a job (at some point) during the
next quadrimester is counted as unemployed. Hence, if anything, our procedure minimizes the
importance of extensive margin responses.
Durations of non-employment spells. Figure 2 displays the histograms of non-employment
spells for non-college and college individuals. These histograms provide us with important
information regarding the nature of labour supply at the extensive margin. Approximately half
of all non-employment spells last for only one quadrimester, and only around 25% of the spells
last for more than four quadrimesters (i.e. more than 16 months). In general, college individuals
tend to spend more periods in non-employment, although as discussed above they are much less
likely to enter non-employment spells.
Figure 3 reveals additional insightful information by reporting the histograms of non-
employment spells also by age. We observe a pronounced life-cycle pattern, with older individuals
spending more periods into non-employment. Nevertheless, even for the old age group of 55–61
year olds, around 50% (60%) of the non-employment spells for non-college (college) individuals
last for one or two periods, indicating an active extensive margin of labour supply even at an old
age.
2.2. Lifetime labour supply
The dispersion in lifetime labour supply is another useful statistic, which is closely related to the
persistence in an individual’s labour supply over time. We use the PSID for the period 1968–97
in order to compute all annual statistics. The sample is restricted to men between the ages of 25
and 61. We consider an individual to be high school if he has at most 12 years of education while
those with 14 years of education or more are considered to be college graduates. We keep in the
sample those born between 1922 and 1962.
Due to the nature of the PSID data set, we do not observe individuals throughout all their
life—some of them have already been in the labour market for some time when the survey starts
in 1968 while those who enter the labour market in 1968 at the age of 25 are only in their 50s
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Figure 4
Coefﬁcient of variation in hours and lifetime hours, PSID.
Notes: For each 10 year period (e.g. between the ages of 35 and 44), let hij denote the annual hours worked for individual
i who is j years old and let h˜i = (∑44j=35hij) denote the individual i’s lifetime hours during this period. The coefﬁcient of
variation in lifetime hours across all i individuals is CV (h˜i). The coefﬁcient of variation in hours across all individuals of
age j is CVj(hij). For each age group G, the ﬁgure reports the average of CVj(hij) over all the ages j∈G.
in 1997. Nevertheless, we can learn a lot even if we follow individuals for shorter periods. We
choose to follow individuals for periods of 10 years at different stages in their life cycle: ages
25–34, 35–44, 45–54, and 55–61. We drop all individuals who have a missing observation during
the relevant 10 years and sum the hours worked for each individual during the whole 10 years.
Then we compute the coefﬁcient of variation of this 10-year cumulative measure of hours worked
and refer to it as a measure of the dispersion in lifetime hours. In addition, we also compute, on
exactly the same sample, the coefﬁcient of variation of cross-sectional annual hours and refer to
it as a measure of the dispersion in hours.
A comparison of the coefﬁcient of variation of annual hours and lifetime hours reveals
information about the persistence of inequality in hours. If the coefﬁcient of variation of lifetime
hours is much smaller than that of annual hours, it implies that year-to-year ﬂuctuations in hours,
for a given individual, tend to cancel out over time. Hence, when individual hours of work
are not persistent across years, inequality in lifetime hours diminishes with the length of the
period considered. When inequality in hours across individuals is ﬁxed (or highly persistent), the
coefﬁcients of variation in lifetime hours and annual hours are equal (or close to each other).
Figure 4 reports the measured dispersion in cross-sectional and lifetime hours for the four
age groups deﬁned above. Non-college individuals display higher dispersions in both cross-
sectional and lifetime hours. Further, the analysis provides us with two important ﬁndings. First,
the dispersion in cumulative hours is quite substantial, indicating that individuals tend to be
quite persistent in their labour supply behaviour. Secondly, the dispersion of cumulative hours
is smaller than the cross-sectional dispersion at any age in the 25–61 interval. This implies that
workers do sometimes change their hours worked.
2.3. Non-linear earnings
In cross-sectional data, there is a positive correlation between hourly wages and hours worked—
i.e. those that work more hours also receive higher hourly wages. This result could be due to
selection (those who work long hours may be more productive) or could be due to the fact that
individuals choose to work less hours during periods of relatively low hourly wages. However,
various studies have also documented the existence of an additional mechanism—individuals that
decide (for reasons other than changes in the hourly wage) to work fewer hours do get offered
lower hourly wages.10 For example, Gustman and Steinmeier (1985) document that individuals
that enter partial retirement experience—depending on whether they remain in their main job
or not—a 15–23% drop in their hourly wages.11 More recently, Aaronson and French (2004)
estimate the quantitative importance of this mechanism by exploiting the sharp decline in hours
worked for working men at the ages of 62 and 65 in U.S. data. They treat this decline in hours
worked for those who work (relative to a quadratic age polynomial in hours worked over the
life cycle) as exogenous variation in hours worked, and thus a useful instrument in the empirical
analysis, caused by the U.S. social security rules that discourage individuals at those ages from
working long hours. They ﬁnd that men who cut their work-week from 40 to 20 hours experience a
20–25% decline in their hourly wage. In order to control for the fact that workers that reduce their
working hours might be also changing the type of work they do on the job, either by switching
employers or by switching their occupation within the same employer, they further restrict the
analysis to workers that remain in the same job and/or same occupation. Finally, since the various
data sets used in the analysis are all longitudinal and follow individuals over time, the estimation
controls for individual ﬁxed effects and thus for unobserved quality and productivity differences
between those that work long and short number of hours.12
3. MODEL
We develop a life-cycle theory of labour supply of individuals along the intensive and extensive
margins. The model abstracts from the labour supply decisions of women and analyses only
males. We consider a small open economy facing a ﬁxed interest rate.
3.1. Population, preferences, and endowments
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals who start their lives at age
25, face uncertain lifetimes, and live, at most, J periods. They differ in terms of their education
(college versus non-college), labour productivity, and taste for leisure. The college decision is
exogenous, and the education type of an individual determines the stochastic processes driving
the mortality, taste, and labour productivity shocks.
Preferences. The date-t utility function takes the form
ut =u(ct,lt)= (1−ϕ)lnct +ϕ l
1−σ
t
1−σ −I(lt<1)F, (1)
where ct is consumption and lt denotes leisure. Individuals are heterogeneous in their taste for
leisure ϕ∈ (0,1), which evolves stochastically over time. Individuals who work (lt <1) face
a ﬁxed disutility cost of work (F). The utility function is consistent with balanced growth—
this assumption allows the theory to be consistent with the fact that there are large permanent
10. See Gustman and Steinmeier (1985) and Aaronson and French (2004) for references to the literature that has
studied this issue.
11. Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) argue that a structural model of retirement with such a feature matches very
well the labour supply patterns after the age of 60.
12. Mofﬁtt (1984), using taste shifters, such as children, as instruments in a wage on hours regression, and
Keane and Wolpin (2001), using a structural model, also ﬁnd evidence of tied wage-hours offers.
differences in labour productivities across individuals (heterogeneity in ﬁxed effects) but not in
their lifetime labour supply.13
Individuals maximize lifetime expected utility
E
J∑
t=1
β tπt u(ct,lt), (2)
where πt denotes the probability that the individual survives to age t and E denotes the expectation
operator. Each period, as described below, individuals face mortality shocks, labour market risk
(job separation and job ﬁnding risk), shocks to the taste for leisure (ϕ), and labour productivity
risk (z).
Heterogeneity in preferences. For each individual, it is assumed that taste shocks follow the
stochastic process
ϕit =ϕi×ϕt,
where ϕi∼N(μϕ,σ 2ϕ ) is an individual ﬁxed effect determined at birth. The term ϕt is an individual-
speciﬁc shock that represents a stochastic deviation from the mean value ϕi, which follows a
ﬁrst-order autoregressive process.
ϕt = ρϕϕt−1+ηϕt , ηϕt ∼N
(
1−ρϕ,σ 2ηϕ
)
, (3)
ϕ0 ∼ N
(
1,
σ 2ηϕ
1−ρ2ϕ
)
,
where ρϕ denotes the persistence of the shock on preferences for leisure and ηϕt is the innovation
at age t. When individuals enter the model economy, the initial seed for the autoregressive process
(ϕ0) is drawn from the invariant distribution of preference shocks. This assumption implies that
the distribution of shocks does not vary over the life cycle, so that the life-cycle patterns of labour
supply implied by the theory are not due to variation in preferences over the life cycle. While the
parameters (μϕ,σ 2ϕ ,ρϕ,σ
2
ηϕ
) vary across education types, this is omitted to simplify the notation.
Labour services. An individual’s time endowment in each period is one. The amount of time
that can be allocated to work is hj =1−lj. It is assumed that the mapping from hours of
work to labour services is non-linear, as in Hornstein and Prescott (1993), French (2005), and
Rogerson and Wallenius (2009). The idea is that h hours of work map into hθ units of labour
services, with θ ≥1. The case θ =1 corresponds to the standard model that assumes a linear
mapping from hours to labour services. The case θ >1 gives rise to a model economy in which
earnings are a non-linear function of hours of work. Earnings of an individual with labour
productivity z and working hours h are
w(z,h)=zhθ . (4)
13. To illustrate this point, for each cohort and education group we divide individuals into high and low productivity
types. We compute each individual’s mean wage over the age of 30–45 and classify them into high and low types depending
on whether their mean wages are above or below the median wage in their cohort-education category. We then compute
mean hours worked for high and low types and ﬁnd that there are virtually no differences in labour supply. Focusing on the
age group 30–45 and non-college individuals, the average hours worked across all cohorts is 2143 for type 1 individuals
and 2166 for the type 2. For individuals with college education, average hours are 2269 and 2271 for type 1 and type 2,
respectively.
The calibration of the model will rely on estimates by Aaronson and French (2004) to pin
down the value of θ . In the Online Appendix A, we use the production technology proposed
by Hornstein and Prescott (1993) to show that it gives rise to a competitive equilibrium in which
earnings follow the functional form speciﬁed in (4).
Heterogeneity in labour productivity. For each education group, labour productivity zt is
assumed to change stochastically over the life cycle according to:
ln(zit)=xtκ+αi+ut, (5)
where zit denotes labour productivity of individual i at age t, xt is a quartic polynomial in
age, κ is a vector of coefﬁcients, αi∼N
(
−σ 2α2 ,σ 2α
)
is a ﬁxed effect determined at birth, and ut
is a persistent productivity shock. Each period, it is assumed that with probability two-thirds
the productivity shock remains constant ut =ut−1 and with probability one-third it follows a
ﬁrst-order autoregression:
ut =ρuut−1+ηut , ηut ∼N
(
−σ
2
ηu
2
,σ 2ηu
)
, u0 =0. (6)
While the parameters = (κ,σ 2α ,ρu,σ 2ηu ) vary across education types, this is omitted to
simplify the notation. At age 62, labour productivity becomes zero so that all individuals are
retired by this age.
Labour market frictions. Individuals start each period in three possible labour market states:
employed (e), non-employed (n), and unemployed (u). Employed individuals (e) at the beginning
of the period are those that have a job offer at that point, and face the decision of whether to work
or not. The main distinction between the last two states (n and u) is that unemployment insurance
beneﬁts bu are assumed to be paid only to the unemployed. The transitions in labour market status
across periods depend on the labour supply decisions of individuals (whether to work or not) and
on two labour market shocks, an exogenous job separation shock (δ) and a job ﬁnding rate (p), as
described in Table 1. Individuals that start the period as employed and choose to work (h>0) face
at the end of the period a job separation shock: with probability δ they are exogenously separated
and start next period in the unemployment state, or with probability (1−δ) they do not suffer a job
separation and start next period as employed. Individuals that start the period as employed and
choose not to work (h=0) ﬁnd a job at the end of the period with probability p so that next period
they start as either employed (with probability p) or non-employed (with probability 1−p). Since
unemployed individuals ﬁnd a job with probability p, they transit to the employment state with
such probability. Unemployed individuals that do not ﬁnd a job (an event with probability 1−p)
transit next period to the non-employment state. Since unemployed individuals transit into either
employment (with probability p) or non-employment (with probability 1−p), individuals can
only collect unemployment insurance during the period they were exogenously separated from
their job. The parameters δ and p do not vary with age over the life cycle, but they do vary across
the two education groups. We also assumed that both unemployed and non-employed individuals
face the same job ﬁnding rate p.
3.2. Government
The government taxes consumption, capital income, and labour income. It is assumed that
consumption and capital income are taxed at ﬂat rates (τc,τk). Earnings y are taxed according to a
TABLE 1
Labour market transitions
s′
s and hours e u n
e, h>0 1−δ δ 0
e, h=0 p 0 1−p
u p 0 1−p
n p 0 1−p
progressive tax schedule T (y). The tax revenue is used to ﬁnance government expenditures, which
are assumed not to provide utility to individuals or to enter in an additively separable fashion in the
utility function. The government administers an unemployment insurance scheme that provides
unemployment beneﬁts for one period to those individuals who were laid off in the current period.
Unemployment beneﬁts are set to a ﬁxed proportion of individual’s potential earnings, computed
as the earnings the individual would have made had he worked full time—40% of available
time—during the quadrimester.
The government also administers a pay-as-you-go social security system. We model a stylized
representation of the U.S. social security system. Pension beneﬁts in the U.S. are a function of
the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) over the 35 highest earnings years. Modelling in
detail how pension beneﬁts depend on the history of earnings of individuals requires the modelling
of a state variable that summarizes average past earnings—an approach which substantially
complicates the computational task in a model which is rich in many other dimensions. To
simplify the computational procedure, we follow a large literature (see, for instance, (Low et al.,
2010) and (Kaplan, 2012a)) in assuming that pension beneﬁts are a function of individual’s ﬁxed
characteristics: education and the ﬁxed effect in labour market productivity. We assume that the
government collects a payroll tax (τss) to ﬁnance social security outlays.
3.3. Credit markets
Individuals can insure mortality risk in fair annuity markets.14 Denoting by R the gross interest
rate net of capital income taxes τk, the gross interest rate faced by an individual j years old with
education e is given by
Rej =1+
(
1+r
πej
−1
)
(1−τk), (7)
where πej is the conditional probability that an age j−1 individual with education e survives to
age j. We assume that individuals can borrow up to an exogenous ﬁxed limit (a′ ≥a) except for
the last period of life.15 The fact that the interest rate is adjusted by the individual’s mortality rate
is derived from a zero-proﬁt condition in the problem of ﬁnancial intermediaries competing for
deposits ((Erosa et al., 2012)). At age T we impose a non-negative constraint on savings (aT+1 ≥
0) capturing the fact that ﬁnancial intermediaries are not willing to make loans to individuals
that will be dead next period with probability 1. Note that there are no accidental bequests due to
14. This is done to avoid taking a stand on how accidental bequests are distributed across individuals. Note that the
taxation of capital income makes the after tax return on annuities actuarially unfair.
15. Keane and Wolpin (2001), in a structural model of educational attainment, ﬁnd that borrowing constraints for
youth are fairly tight. Keane and Wolpin (2001) also provide an overview of the literature on the importance of borrowing
constraints on educational attainment and life-cycle consumption.
the presence of annuity markets. Nonetheless, from the perspective of households annuities are 
unfair because of the taxation of capital income.
3.4. The individual’s problem
We use recursive language to describe the problem of an individual. To simplify the notation, we
abstract from the fact that the education type of an individual determines his labour productivity
process, mortality risk, and labour market shocks. Then, the state of an individual is given by his
age j, assets a, and earnings shock z, taste shock ϕ, and labour market status s. At the beginning
of the period, prior to the labour supply decision, individuals can be in one of three labour market
states s: employed (e), non-employed (n), and unemployed (u). As discussed above, the only
difference between being in the labour market states (n) and (u) is that in the latter individuals
can collect unemployment insurance beneﬁts.
Earnings can take one of several forms: labour earnings, unemployment insurance bu, and
pension beneﬁts paid by the social security system bs. Earnings are assumed to be taxed
progressively according to a progressive tax schedule T (y). The budget constraint is then given
by
Vj(a,z,ϕ,s) = max{c,h,a′}
{
u(c,l,ϕ)+βπj+1E[Vj+1(a′,z′,ϕ′,s′(h,s))]
}
(8)
s. t.
a′ = y(z,h,s)−T (y(z,h,s))+Rja−c (1+τ c),
a′ ≥ a,
where the expectation operator is taken over productivity, taste, and labour market shocks. The
labour market state next period, s′, is a stochastic function of the current labour market state, s,
and current working hours h, as described in Table 1. We impose mandatory retirement at the age
of 62 at which point individuals start collecting pension beneﬁts. The only source of uncertainty
faced by retired individuals is in their preference shock (ϕ) and mortality shocks.
3.5. Discussion on non-linear earnings and labour supply decisions
In the Online Appendix B, we show the following properties of labour supply decisions in a
simpliﬁed version of our economy with non-linear earnings:
• Intensive margin: Hours of work along the intensive margin are bounded away from
zero. They are decreasing in non-labour income (x) and taste for leisure (ϕ), and they
are increasing in labour productivity (z). The Frisch elasticity of leisure is determined by
the curvature of the utility function on leisure (σ ), and it is not affected by the assumption
of non-linear earnings. The Frisch elasticity of labour supply along the intensive margin
decreases with hours of work and is given by ηh = 1σ (1−h)/h.• Extensive margin: Non-linear earnings penalize individuals working low hours because
marginal earnings are close to zero when hours are low. Non-linear earnings encourages
individuals to work either long hours or not at all. This trade-off makes the extensive
margin of labour supply decisions more prominent, even in the absence of ﬁxed costs
of work F=0. Ceteris paribus, individuals that choose not to work are characterized by
either a high value of non-labour income (x), taste for leisure (ϕ), or low productivity (z).
The aggregate Frisch elasticity of labour supply along the extensive margin is determined
by preference parameters (ϕ,σ ), technology parameters (θ ), and the joint distribution of
individuals characteristics (x,z,ϕ) in the population.
• Homotheticity: A doubling of labour earnings (z) and non-labour income (x) has no
consequences for labour supply decisions along the extensive and intensive margins.
4. CALIBRATION
We divide the parameters of the model economy in two groups. The ﬁrst group includes parameters
that are pinned down without simulating the model economy (such as, mortality rates and tax
rates). The second group is composed of parameters that are calibrated by simulating the model
economy.
4.1. Parameters calibrated without simulating the model economy
The model period is set to one quadrimester (four months). The model economy is solved in
partial equilibrium for a ﬁxed interest rate. The quadrimesterly interest rate is chosen so that the
implied annual rate of return on capital (net of depreciation) is 4%.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of leisure. In the calibrated baseline economy,
we choose σ =2.0 that implies an intertemporal elasticity of leisure of 0.5. We also report the
results for an alternatively calibrated economy with σ =3 (an intertemporal elasticity of leisure
of one-third).
Non-linear earnings. The hourly wage in our theory satisﬁes
wh(z,h)= zh
θ
h
=zhθ−1. (9)
Note that the elasticity of the wage rate to a change in hours of work is given by (θ −1). As
we discussed in Section 2.3, in an empirical study Aaronson and French (2004) estimate this
elasticity to be around 0.40. This estimate implies that a full time (40 hours a week) worker earns
an hourly wage 20% higher than a part time (20 hours) worker. We thus set θ =1.4.
Tax rates, social security, and unemployment insurance beneﬁts. The tax rate on consumption
τc is set at 0.075 as in McDaniel (2007). Following Domeij and Heathcote (2004), taxes on capital
income are set to τk =0.40. The social security tax rate is set to τss =0.153, and the cap y on social
security taxation is ﬁxed at 2.47 of average earnings in the economy (y). Taxes on earnings (non-
capital income) are set according to a progressive tax schedule with 5 tax brackets. Following
French (2005), we parameterize the tax schedule using data on U.S. federal and state income
taxes for household heads (with the standard deduction) in 1990 in the state of Rhode Island,
which is a fairly representative state in terms of its income tax system. The tax brackets are
deﬁned by the following thresholds expressed as multiples of the average earnings (y) in the
economy: 0.10,0.16,0.63, and 1.93. The corresponding tax rates for the ﬁve tax brackets are
0%,13.2%,17.9%,32.9%, and 36.9%.
As discussed before, for computational simplicity we follow a vast literature in modelling a
stylized representation of the U.S. social security system. For each education level, we assume
two different values for average lifetime earnings (one value for each of the two possible ﬁxed
effects on labour productivity). Then the average earnings for each of the four productivity types
are computed according to the beneﬁt formula of the U.S. social security system (the U.S. social
security beneﬁt formula is a function of the Primary Insurance Amount and has two bend points
at 0.2 and 1.24 of the average earnings in the economy).
The unemployment insurance beneﬁt is set to 40% of the potential earnings of the unemployed
worker, where potential earnings are computed assuming a work week of 40% of available time.
Mortality rates. The mortality risk for college and non-college individuals is taken from
Bhattacharya and Lakdawalla (2006).
Exogenous job separation rates into unemployment. Based on the empirical analysis in Section
2.1, we set the exogenous separation rates into unemployment (δ) in a quadrimester to 2.4% for
non-college and 1.16% for college.
4.2. Parameters calibrated by simulating the model economy
Rather than simulating the model to calibrate all the parameters at once, we ﬁnd it convenient to
partition the parameters in two subgroups and to follow an iterative procedure with two nested
loops. The parameters in each of the two subgroups are calibrated in two separate loops in order to
diminish the dimensionality of the calibration. In the inner loop, for ﬁxed values of the parameters
calibrated in the outer loop, we calibrate the parameters determining the stochastic process on taste
for leisure, the job ﬁnding rate, and the ﬁxed utility cost of work. Given the parameters obtained
in the inner loop, the outer loop calibrates the parameters determining the labour productivity
process, discount rate, average earnings in the economy (used to deﬁne tax schedules), average
lifetime earnings for the four ﬁxed productivity types (used to compute pension beneﬁts for the
two ﬁxed productivity types in each of the two education groups), and the exogenous borrowing
limit.
4.2.1. Inner loop. The inner loop pins down the parameters determining the heterogene-
ity in the taste for leisure (ϕ), the ﬁxed utility cost of work (F), and the job ﬁnding rate (p). Recall
that taste for leisure (ϕ) depends on an individual ﬁxed effect (ϕi) and a stochastic shock (ϕt).
The ﬁxed effect is drawn from a normal distribution, ϕi∼N(μϕ,σ 2ϕ ). The stochastic shock (ϕt)
represents a deviation from the mean value and follows a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process with
persistence ρϕ and innovation ηϕ (see equation (3)). The innovation is drawn from a normal
distribution with variance σ 2ηϕ . The initial value of ϕt (at age 25) is drawn from the invariant
distribution so that the cross-sectional distribution of taste shocks does not vary over the life
cycle.16 Hence, we need to pin down, for each education group, six parameters: four values
determining the heterogeneity in taste for leisure (μϕ,σ 2ϕ ,ρϕ,σ
2
ηϕ
) plus the ﬁxed utility cost of
leisure F and the job ﬁnding rate p. The values of these parameters are obtained by minimizing the
distance (square of the sum of deviations) between the model and the SIPP data on the following
statistics:
1. Average employment rates in a quadrimester for four age groups (25–34, 35–44,45–54,
and 55–61), as computed in Section 2.1 from the SIPP.
2. The probability of entering a non-employment spell in a quadrimester for four age groups
(25–34, 35–44,45–54, and 55–61), as computed in Section 2.1 from the SIPP.
16. The continuous stochastic process in the model for the taste for leisure is approximated with a Tauchen procedure,
with nine possible values (three for the ﬁxed effects and three for the persistent taste shock).
3. The fraction of all non-employment spells lasting one, two, three, or more than three
quadrimesters, as computed in Section 2.1 from the SIPP.
4. The coefﬁcient of variation of lifetime hours for workers between the ages of 35 and 44,
as computed in Section 2.2 from the PSID: 0.35 for non-college and 0.23 for college
individuals, respectively.
5. Average mean hours of work in a quadrimester among prime-age males. Following
Osuna and Ríos-Rull (2003) and Prescott (2004), the time endowment is set at 5200 hours a
year (100 hours per week). Using data from the 1990 SIPPon prime-age males with positive
hours of work, 35–50 years old, we obtain that non-college and college individuals work,
on average, about 41.2% and 43.5% of their time endowments in a quadrimester.
Therefore, we use 14 moments from the data in order to parameterize the six parameters in
this stage of the calibration process. Even though there is no one-to-one mapping between the
parameters and the moments in the data, it is possible to provide intuition as to which moments
help identify the model parameters. The job ﬁnding rate (p) is identiﬁed from the fraction of
non-employment spells lasting one, two, three, or more quadrimesters. However, most powerful
among these is the fraction of non-employment spells lasting one quadrimester—individuals that
experience an exogenous job separation would usually choose to immediately go back to work
after one quadrimester, and a job ﬁnding rate of p<1 is the only friction preventing that. The
ﬁxed utility cost of work (F) is identiﬁed from employment rates over the life cycle—higher ﬁxed
utility costs of work lead to lower employment rates. The mean of the ﬁxed effect in the taste
for leisure (μϕ) is identiﬁed from the mean hours of work in a quadrimester while the variance
in the ﬁxed effect in the taste for leisure (σ 2ϕ ) is identiﬁed from the coefﬁcient of variation in the
lifetime hours worked—a higher dispersion in the lifetime hours implies a higher variance in the
taste for leisure ﬁxed effect. Finally, the persistence and the innovation to the taste for leisure
stochastic shock (ρϕ,σ 2ηϕ ) are identiﬁed from the entry rates into non-employment (especially
those that are not due to exogenous job separations) and the fraction of non-employment spells
lasting two, three, or more quadrimesters.
4.2.2. Outer loop. The outer loop pins down the parameters governing the labour
productivity process, discount rate, average earnings in the economy (used to deﬁne tax
schedules), average lifetime earnings for four productivity types (in order to compute social
security beneﬁts), and the exogenous borrowing limit. The labour productivity process is
calibrated, through an iterative procedure that ensures that the model is consistent with data
moments on hourly wages over the life cycle. Since the SIPP is longitudinally fairly short to
allow us to estimate the stochastic process for wages, we use the PSID for this purpose. In
calibrating a quadrimesterly stochastic process on labour productivity, one difﬁculty arises from
the fact that the PSID only reports earnings and hours of work at an annual frequency. Moreover,
we need to consider that the data only report wages for individuals that work. To deal with these
problems, we follow an iterative procedure:
1. Estimate a wage proﬁle and wage process for college and non-college workers on annual
data from the PSID data. In particular, we specify the following annual process for log
hourly wages:
ln(w˜h)ij = x˜jκ˜+α˜i+ u˜j+ λ˜j, (10)
where ln(w˜h)ij represents the observed annual log hourly wage of individual i at age j in the
PSID data, x˜j is a quartic polynomial in age, κ˜ is a vector of coefﬁcients, α˜i∼N
(
−σ 2α˜2 ,σ 2α˜
)
is a ﬁxed effect determined at birth, λ˜j∼N
(
−σ
2
λ˜
2 ,σ
2
λ˜j
)
is an idiosyncratic transitory shock
which is interpreted as measurement error, and u˜j follows a ﬁrst-order autoregressive
process:17
u˜j = ρ˜u˜uj−1+ η˜uj , η˜uj∼N
(
−σ
2
η˜u
2
,σ 2η˜u
)
, u˜0 =0. (11)
2. Feed a quadrimesterly labour productivity process = (κ,ρu,σ 2α ,σ 2ηu ) into the model
economy as speciﬁed in Section 3.1.18
3. Simulate the model economy to obtain quadrimesterly data on employment, hours of work,
and earnings.
4. Aggregate the quadrimesterly data to an annual period.
5. Estimate an annual hourly wage proﬁle and hourly wage stochastic process for college and
non-college workers in the model generated data.
6. Feed a new quadrimesterly labour productivity process (go back to step 2), until the “same”
annual wage proﬁle and stochastic wage process is obtained in the model and in the data.
Following Kaplan and Violante (2010), the discount factor β is chosen to match an asset to
income ratio of 2.5. This is the wealth to income ratio when the top 5% of households in the
wealth distribution are excluded from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The reason for
excluding the richest households in computing an aggregate wealth to income ratio is that the
PSID under-samples the top of the wealth distribution. The borrowing limit (a) is pinned down
so that the model is consistent with the consumption growth rate between ages 25 and 55 of about
25% (Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger, 2007). We assume a common value of β and a for the
two education groups since we target aggregate data, across the two education groups, on the
asset to income ratio and consumption growth over the life cycle.
4.3. Calibration results
4.3.1. Outer loop. Our calibration procedure implies a value for the discount factor
of β =0.983 and a borrowing constraint equivalent to 40% of average annual earnings in the
economy. The latter estimate is similar to the one obtained by Kaplan (2012a). As argued in
Kaplan (2012a), if borrowing were not allowed consumption growth predicted by the theory
would be counterfactually high. The calibration implies a capital to output ratio of 2.6 and a
mean consumption growth over the life cycle of 24%, which are close to the targets of 2.5 and
25% respectively. Table 2 reports the values of the parameters driving the stochastic process on
labour productivity in the baseline economy. These parameters were determined using the iterative
procedure described above (see Section 4.2.2). The stochastic process on wages estimated on the
model data and on the PSID data deliver similar estimates. Moreover, Figure 5 shows that the
model mimics well the life-cycle proﬁle of wages.
17. We follow Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and Low et al. (2010) in interpreting the purely iid component in
residual log wages (or annual earnings) as measurement error. Meghir and Pistaferri (2011) provide an overview of the
literature and the available speciﬁcations of the stochastic processes of wages (and earnings).
18. A Tauchen procedure is used to approximate the stochastic process with a ﬁnite number of realizations of the
shock. We use two values for the ﬁxed effect and 20 values for the persistent shock.
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TABLE 2
Calibration of the stochastic process for wages
Non-College
Parameter Value Moment Data Model
σ 2α 0.094 σ
2
α˜ 0.094 0.097
ρu 0.949 ρ˜u 0.941 0.940
σ 2ηu 0.014 σ
2
η˜u
0.019 0.019
College
Parameter Value Moment Data Model
σ 2α 0.065 σ
2
α˜ 0.075 0.074
ρu 0.982 ρ˜u 0.968 0.977
σ 2ηu 0.016 σ
2
η˜u
0.019 0.020
Figure 5
Deterministic life-cycle wage proﬁle, PSID and model.
TABLE 3
Calibration of parameters in the inner loop
Variable Parameter Non-college College
Prob. of ﬁnding a job p 0.69 0.59
Mean of ﬁxed effect of taste for leisure μϕi 0.60 0.55
Std. dev. of ﬁxed effect of taste for leisure σϕi 0.12 0.11
Pers. of transitory shock of taste for leisure ρϕt 0.73 0.21
Std. dev. of transitory shock of taste for leisure σηϕ 0.006 0.008
Fixed cost of work (% consumption loss) Fˆ 0.085 0.105
4.3.2. Inner loop. Table 3 reports the parameters obtained in the inner loop. The
calibration implies that individuals from both education groups face a job ﬁnding rate below
one (0.69 and 0.59 for non-college and college) and substantial ﬁxed (utility) costs of work. To
make sense of the importance of the ﬁxed costs of work, it is convenient to rewrite the utility
function as follows:
u(ct,lt) = (1−ϕ)lnct +ϕ l
1−σ
t
1−σ −I(lt<1)F,
= (1−ϕ)ln
(
ct
1+Fˆ
)
+ϕ l
1−σ
t
1−σ
where Fˆ ≡ exp
(
F
1−ϕ
)
−1 if lt <1, and equal to 0 otherwise.
The calibration implies the utility cost of work is equivalent to losses in consumption of
8.5% and 10.5% for non-college and college individuals, respectively. In Section 5.1.2, we argue
that these numbers are consistent with the evidence from Aguiar and Hurst (2013) on work-
related expenditures. The calibration implies substantial heterogeneity in the preference shocks
for the non-college and college individuals, with a coefﬁcient of variation of around 0.20 for both
education groups.19
4.3.3. Other moments targeted in the calibration. We now show how the baseline
model economy matches the moments targeted in the calibration. We emphasize that, except for
the age-proﬁle of labour productivity, all the parameters in the model do not vary with age. In
particular, our calibration assumes that the job separation and job ﬁnding rates, the ﬁxed cost
of work, and the distribution of preference shocks are constant over the life cycle. Hence, the
life-cycle patterns shown below are the result of the model features driving life-cycle behaviour:
a ﬁnite time horizon, asset accumulation for retirement, precautionary savings, and the age proﬁle
of wages.
Employment rates. The baseline economy is consistent with the fact that the age proﬁle of
employment is roughly ﬂat early in the life cycle for both education groups (Figure 6). The model
tends to over-predict employment rates, though not by much. The baseline economy captures
the fact that for non-college individuals employment starts declining at age 45 and that this
decline accelerates substantially after age 55. Moreover, consistent with the data, the decline in
the employment rate for college individuals starts at an older age than for non-college. Overall,
the model captures quite well, qualitatively and quantitatively, the decline in employment rates
late in the life cycle.
Hours worked along the intensive margin and lifetime labour supply. The model economy
matches the targets of 0.412 and 0.435 for the average hours of work for prime-aged college
and non-college individuals (aged 35–50), respectively. Matching these targets requires that the
weight on leisure in the utility function be higher for non-college than for college individuals
(0.60 versus 0.55).
The model is also consistent with the heterogeneity in lifetime labour supply in the PSID data.
The calibration targeted the coefﬁcient of variation of lifetime hours of work for the 35–44 age
group, which takes the value of 0.35 for non-college and 0.23 for college individuals, respectively
(see Section 2.2). To match this fact, the calibration requires substantial heterogeneity in the
19. The patterns in the preference heterogeneity are consistent with the analysis in Heathcote et al. (2014) who,
using different identifying restrictions, reach similar conclusions.
Figure 6
Employment rate, 1990 SIPP and model.
Figure 7
Entry rate into non-employment, 1990 SIPP and model.
Notes: The entry rate into non-employment is measured as the fraction of those employed in quadrimester t that are
non-employed in quadrimester t+1.
taste for leisure for both education groups, with a bigger variance for non-college than college
individuals.
Entry into non-employment spells. The calibration targets the quadrimesterly hazard rates into
non-employment over the life cycle. Note that the transition rates from employment into non-
employment provide information on the variation of labour supply decisions along the extensive
margin. Hence, this target is important for disciplining the predictions of the theory for how the
aggregate employment rate responds to temporary wage shocks. Figure 7 shows that the model
matches quite well the hazard rates into non-employment. The baseline economy matches well
the fact that the hazard rates have a U shape over the life cycle and are higher for non-college
than college individuals. We emphasize that the life-cycle proﬁle for hazard rates are not due to
variation in preference shocks over the life cycle. As we shall discuss later, allowing for (positive)
borrowing and modelling preference heterogeneity is important for the decline in hazard rates
early in the life cycle. The accumulation of assets over the life cycle and the increase in the
variance of labour productivity with age is important for the increase in the transitions from
employment into non-employment late in the life cycle.
Figure 8
Non-employment spells, 1990 SIPP and model.
Non-employment spells. The length of non-employment spells provides a measure of the
“volatility” of labour supply decisions along the extensive margin. If people that quit jobs go
back to work the next period, then labour supply decisions along the extensive margin are quite
“volatile.” We thus think it is important that the baseline economy is consistent with evidence on
entry into non-employment as well as with the duration of non-employment spells. An important
achievement of our theory is that it is consistent with evidence on both the incidence and the
volatility of non-employment. Figure 8 shows that the model matches fairly well, qualitatively
and quantitatively, the statistics on the length of non-employment spells documented on SIPP
data. Non-employment spells are divided in four groups depending on their length: 1, 2, 3, or
4+ quadrimesters. For both education groups, in the SIPP and model data, more than 50% of all
non-employment spells last one period and the fraction of non-employment spells lasting four or
more periods is about 20%.
4.3.4. Moments not targeted in the calibration. The model also performs very well in
dimensions not directly targeted in the calibration procedure.
Hours worked. The calibration targeted the employment rate for four age groups and the mean
hours worked for employed prime-age males (35–50 years old). Figure 9 shows that the model
matches the age proﬁle of average hours worked in the population (including individuals with
zero hours worked) quite well. Figure 10 shows that the overall distribution of hours worked
in a quadrimester in the baseline model economy is similar to the distribution observed in the
1990 SIPP. In particular, the distribution is bimodal, the mass of individuals working zero hours
increases with age, and the mass of individuals working full time (between 600 and 900 hours in
a quadrimester) decreases with age.
Unemployment–employment (UE) ﬂow rates. We now compare the UE ﬂow rates in the model
with those in the data. This comparison is interesting because our calibration of the job ﬁnding
rate p did not directly target data on UE transitions. As discussed in Section 4.2.1, our calibration
minimized a loss function that used information in the duration of non-employment spells.
Alternatively, p can be identiﬁed with data on the job ﬁnding rate of unemployed individual.
We argue, however, that this alternative approach will not change our results. We use the 1990
SIPP data set to compute the monthly ﬂow rates from unemployment into employment (UE). For
prime age males, we obtain a ﬂow rate of 0.243 for non-college and 0.199 for college individuals.
Figure 9
Mean hours, 1990 SIPP and model.
These monthly UE ﬂow rates are consistent with evidence from other studies.20 A 0.243 monthly
UE ﬂow rate implies that an individual that is unemployed in a given month will become employed
within the next four months with probability 0.67.21 The quadrimesterly UE ﬂow rate for non-
college individuals in the model is 0.68. Similarly, the quadrimesterly UE ﬂow rate for college
individuals from the 1990 SIPP of 0.58 is basically the same as the one in the model. Therefore,
the benchmark calibration is consistent with the UE ﬂow rates observed in the 1990 SIPP data.
In light of these results, we conclude that the ﬁndings in our article essentially will not change if
we pin down p by targeting UE ﬂow rates.
Non-employment spells by age. The calibration targeted statistics on the duration distribution of
all non-employment spells. Figure 11 shows that the model captures quite well how the duration
distribution of non-employment spells varies over the life cycle in the SIPPdata. When individuals
are young, both for non-college and college individuals, about 60% of the non-employment spells
last for only one period. As individuals age, this fraction decreases and is about 40% for the age
group 55–61. On the other hand, for both educational categories, the fraction of non-employment
spells that are of length equal to four or more periods grows over the life cycle reaching a value
close to 40% for the age group 55–61. The model matches these facts closely.
Cross-sectional heterogeneity in hours and lifetime labour supply by age. Consistent with the
SIPP data, the model predicts that the coefﬁcient of variation in hours of work is large, grows with
age, and at the end of the life cycle reaches a value above 0.6 for non-college and of about 0.4 for
college individuals (Figure 12). Recall that our calibration procedure implies that the variance
of taste for leisure is constant over the life cycle. Hence, the increase in the variance of working
hours with age is due to an increase in the variances of labour productivity and wealth over the
life cycle. For all age groups, both in the model and in the data, heterogeneity in labour supply is
larger for non-college than college individuals.
The calibration targeted the coefﬁcient of variation of lifetime hours for the age group 35–44.
The baseline economy matches remarkably closely how inequality in lifetime labour supply (the
20. Menzio et al. (2016), using the 1996 SIPP data set, report a monthly UE ﬂow rate for high school males of
0.25; Choi et al. (2015), using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), report a monthly ﬂow rate for males in
the range of 0.23–0.27; Krusell et al. (2010) use an UE ﬂow rate of 0.25 in their analysis.
21. If the monthly UE transition rate is pm, the probability that an unemployed individual does not transit into
employment during a four-month period is (1−pm)4. Conversely, the transition rate from unemployment into employment
(UE transition rate) during a four-month period is then 1−(1−pm)4.
Figure 10
Histograms of hours worked in a quadrimester, 1990 SIPP and benchmark model.
      
 
 
     
 
  
       
 
 
 
 
            
  
     
      
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
       
 
 
 
 
            
 
     
Figure 11
Non-employment spells, 1990 SIPP and model, by age.
Figure 12
Coefﬁcient of variation in hours, PSID and model.
Notes: Let hij denote the annual hours worked for individual i who is j years old. The coefﬁcient of variation in hours
across all individuals of age j is CVj(hij). The ﬁgure reports the average CVj(hij) over a 10-year period (e.g. ages 35–44),
Ej[CVj(hij)].
coefﬁcient of variation over the sum of hours worked during a 10-year period) increases over
the life cycle and that the increase in the inequality of lifetime hours over the life cycle is larger
for non-college than college individuals. Indeed, as seen on Figure 13, quantitatively the model
matches the age-proﬁle of lifetime hours inequality very well for both education groups. Since
the variance of preference shocks is constant over the life cycle, the increase in lifetime-hours
inequality is explained by two mechanisms embedded in the model: life-cycle behaviour and
incomplete markets. Individuals build precautionary savings early in the life cycle to ensure
against idiosyncratic risk. As they age and accumulate assets, the heterogeneity in asset holdings
translate into more persistent differences in labour supply across individuals.
Figure 13
Coefﬁcient of variation in lifetime hours, PSID and model.
Notes: For each 10-year period (e.g. between the ages of 35 and 44), let hij denote the annual hours worked for individual
i who is j years old and let h˜i = (∑44j=35hij) denote the individual i’s lifetime hours during this period. The coefﬁcient of
variation in lifetime hours across all i individuals is CV (h˜i).
Consumption inequality over the life cycle. We have shown that the baseline economy is
consistent with life-cycle data on U.S. inequality in wages, labour supply, and lifetime labour
supply. Huggett et al. (2011) and Kaplan (2012a) advocate the view that a life-cycle theory of
inequality and incomplete markets should be broadly consistent with evidence on consumption
inequality over the life cycle. It is therefore interesting to compare the baseline economy’s
implications for the rise in consumption dispersion over the life cycle with the patterns found
in U.S. data. The model economy implies a variance of log consumption of 0.17 at age 25 and
of 0.30 at age 60. Hence, consumption inequality rises by 13 log points between the ages of 25
and 60. These implications are consistent with the evidence on consumption inequality reviewed
in Huggett et al. (2011). In particular, Aguiar and Hurst (2013) document that the increase in the
variance of consumption is about 12 log points when consumption is measured as total non-durable
expenditures, with an initial value at age 25 of 0.15. The model’s implications are remarkably
close to these estimates. The Gini index of consumption in the baseline economy is 0.28, which is
again close to the value of 0.26 reported by Krueger and Perri (2006) for the US economy during
the 1990–2000 period.
5. AGGREGATE LABOUR SUPPLY RESPONSES
The analysis so far has shown that the baseline economy is able to match well facts on male
labour supply over the life cycle along the extensive and intensive margins at the individual
level. Therefore, the model economy is an appropriate tool for studying aggregate labour supply
responses to changes in the economic environment. The model is used to explicitly aggregate
up each individual’s response, as well as to analyse how responses vary across subgroups in the
population. Moreover, in a series of experiments we shut down one by one various modelling
assumptions in order to evaluate their importance for understanding aggregate labour supply
responses.
5.1. Response to a temporary wage change
We start by simulating in the baseline economy the aggregate labour supply response to a one-
period (quadrimester) unanticipated wage change of 2%. In principle, one may think that the
TABLE 4
Aggregate labour supply elasticity to a temporary wage change
All Non-college College
Elasticities Total Intensive Extensive Total Intensive Extensive Total Intensive Extensive
1. Baseline economy 1.75 0.67 1.08 1.96 0.67 1.29 1.35 0.66 0.69
2. Low productivity risk 1.42 0.69 0.73 1.60 0.69 0.91 1.09 0.68 0.41
3. No labour market frictions 1.85 0.68 1.17 2.04 0.69 1.35 1.49 0.66 0.83
4. No credit 1.51 0.67 0.84 1.64 0.67 0.97 1.27 0.67 0.60
5. Linear earnings + No Fixed Cost 0.85 0.85 0.0 0.86 0.86 0.00 0.81 0.81 0.00
6. No ﬁxed cost 1.27 0.70 0.57 1.39 0.71 0.68 1.04 0.69 0.35
7. Linear earnings 0.85 0.84 0.01 0.86 0.85 0.01 0.82 0.81 0.01
8. No preference heterogeneity 1.29 0.71 0.58 1.37 0.71 0.66 1.13 0.70 0.43
wealth effect of such a change is negligible so that the change in the aggregate labour supply
provides an estimate of the Frisch elasticity of aggregate labour supply. However, this reasoning
is not ﬁrmly grounded in economic theory as with incomplete markets and borrowing constraints
the Frisch elasticity of labour supply is an ill-deﬁned concept.22 First, with borrowing constraints
the Frisch elasticity does not exist because agents cannot hold the marginal utility of consumption
constant as wages ﬂuctuate. Secondly, with heterogeneity and incomplete markets a change in the
wage rate will affect the marginal utility of wealth differently for different types of people. Hence,
our results in this section should be viewed as describing aggregate labour supply responses to a
temporary wage change rather than the Frisch elasticity of labour supply.23,24
The aggregate elasticity of labour supply to a temporary wage change can be decomposed
in terms of the elasticities along the intensive and extensive margins. The change in the average
hours of work among employed individuals is used to compute the elasticity along the intensive
margin. The elasticity along the extensive margin is given by the elasticity of the employment
rate.25 The results from these computations are reported in Table 4. We ﬁnd that the elasticity
of aggregate labour supply with respect to a temporary wage change in the baseline economy
is 1.75. Restricting attention to labour supply changes along the intensive margin decreases the
response from 1.75 to 0.67. Hence, the extensive margin accounts for about 62% of the aggregate
labour supply response to a temporary wage change.
The elasticity of labour supply to a temporary wage change varies importantly across education
and age groups. It is higher for high school than for college educated individuals (1.96 versus
1.35, respectively). Labour supply responses have a strong life-cycle pattern: the age proﬁle of
the elasticity is U shaped for both education categories. For high school individuals, the elasticity
of labour supply takes a value of 2.01 for the 25–34 age group and decreases to 1.62 for the 35–44
age group. Afterwards, it increases to 1.90 for the 45–54 age group and to 2.74 for the 55–61 age
group. The variation of the elasticity of labour supply for college individuals over the life cycle
exhibits a similar U-shaped pattern. Such a pattern is reminiscent of the fact that over the business
22. See Keane (2011) for a discussion.
23. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
24. We note that in our baseline economy about 93.5% of all individuals experience a less than 0.2% change in
their consumption in response to a 2% wage change implying that the variation caused by a wage change in the marginal
utility of wealth across agents in the baseline economy is small.
25. Aggregate hours of work H can be expressed as H =e×h, where e denotes the employment rate and h mean
working hours. Taking logs and differentiating with respect to the log wage gives an expression for the aggregate elasticity
in terms of the extensive an intensive margin elasticities: ηH =ηe+ηh.
TABLE 5
Extensive margin elasticity to a temporary wage change, by age and education
Panel A: non-college 25−34 35–44 45–54 55–61
1. Baseline economy 1.33 0.95 1.23 2.08
2. Low productivity risk 1.27 0.89 0.82 0.46
3. No labour market frictions 1.09 0.94 1.45 2.68
4. No credit 0.52 0.72 1.21 2.14
5. Linear earnings + no ﬁxed cost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6. No ﬁxed cost 0.67 0.50 0.75 0.97
7. Linear earnings 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
8. No preference heterogeneity 0.30 0.34 0.62 2.28
Panel B: College 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–61
1. Baseline economy 0.64 0.45 0.58 1.42
2. Low productivity risk 0.60 0.40 0.27 0.39
3. No labour market frictions 0.47 0.56 0.72 2.09
4. No credit 0.31 0.42 0.59 1.46
5. Linear earnings + no ﬁxed cost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6. No ﬁxed cost 0.28 0.29 0.34 0.60
7. Linear earnings 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
8. No preference heterogeneity 0.27 0.26 0.31 1.18
cycle hours of work and employment ﬂuctuate much more for young and old individuals than for
the middle-aged, as discussed in Gomme et al. (2005) and Jaimovich and Siu (2009).
The variation of labour supply responses across education and age groups in the baseline
economy is almost all due to changes along the extensive margin. To ﬁx ideas, let us focus
on high school individuals. The intensive margin elasticity is almost ﬂat over the life cycle:
It decreases monotonically from 0.69 at age 25–34 to 0.66 at age 55–61. On the contrary, the
extensive margin elasticity has a U-shape over the life cycle: It starts at 1.33 for the age group
25–34, decreases to 0.95 at age 35–44 and then rises to 1.23 and to 2.08 at ages 45–54 and
55–61, respectively (Table 5). Hence, the U-shaped age proﬁle of the labour supply response
to temporary wage change is thus driven by the variation of labour supply responses along the
extensive margin. A similar conclusion applies to college-educated individuals. Furthermore, the
extensive margin is crucial for understanding differences in the elasticity of labour supply across
education groups. In short, the intensive margin is quantitatively important, but is not a factor
in understanding the variation in the elasticity of aggregate labour supply to a temporary wage
change across age and education groups. All the variation in labour supply responses across these
groups is due to the extensive margin.
5.1.1. Evaluating the importance of modelling assumptions for the response to a
temporary wage change. The baseline economy models (1) productivity risk, (2) labour
market risk, (3) credit markets, (4) ﬁxed cost of work, (5) non-linear earnings, and (6) preference
heterogeneity. We now conduct various experiments to isolate the importance of each of these
modelling assumptions for the aggregate labour supply response to a temporary wage change.
In each of these experiments, we shut down one model assumption and keep the rest of the
parameters of the baseline economy ﬁxed. We then evaluate the labour supply change to a one
period unanticipated wage change of 2% in each of the modiﬁed model economies. The results
from these experiments are summarized below.
Productivity risk. To isolate the role of labour productivity risk, we assume that the standard
deviation of the innovation to the autoregressive process on labour productivity is 100 times
smaller. As a result, we obtain an economy in which individuals essentially do not face labour
productivity risk (apart from the initial ﬁxed effect). The rest of the parameters are kept equal
to the ones in the baseline economy. Table 4, row 2, reports the elasticity of labour supply to a
temporary wage change for the modiﬁed-baseline economy with no labour productivity risk. The
elimination of productivity risk decreases the aggregate elasticity of labour supply from a value
of 1.75 in the baseline economy to 1.42. This decrease is entirely due to a lower labour supply
response at the extensive margin (from 1.08 to 0.73) and is mostly due to old individuals. When
productivity risk is shut down, for both education groups, the elasticity along the extensive margin
for individuals aged 55–61 decreases sharply: It decreases from 2.08 to 0.46 for non-college and
from 1.42 to 0.39 for college individuals (Table 5). This result is explained through the effect of
productivity risk on life-cycle savings in the baseline economy. Since individuals have stronger
incentives to save in order to self-insure against productivity risk, old individuals in the baseline
economy are richer than in the economy with no risk and their employment decisions become
more responsive to temporary wage changes.
Labour market risk. To assess the importance of labour market risk, we consider an economy
in which the probability of ﬁnding a job is set to one (p=1), keeping all other parameters from
the baseline economy constant. The results are reported in row 3 of Table 4. When labour market
risk is shut down the elasticity of aggregate labour supply increases from 1.75 in the baseline
economy to 1.85. Interestingly, this result differs from the previous experiment, where we found
that shutting down labour productivity risk led to a decrease in the aggregate labour supply
response. In understanding why labour market risk and productivity risk have opposite effects on
labour supply decisions, it is important to keep in mind that labour market risk affects labour supply
decisions through two channels. First, it encourages precautionary savings which, as discussed
before, makes employment decisions of old individuals much more responsive to temporary
wage changes. Now, the strength of this effect is much weaker in the case of labour market risk
than productivity risk because in our baseline model economy labour market shocks (job ﬁnding
rates) are not persistent and thereby have a weaker effect on precautionary savings. Secondly, by
making it difﬁcult to ﬁnd a job, labour market risk makes it more costly for individuals to take
periods off work and the extensive margin becomes less responsive to temporary wage changes.
We ﬁnd that the second effect quantitatively prevails, especially late in the life cycle. As a result,
as indicated in Table 5, the labour supply elasticity of high school individuals aged 55–61 along
the extensive margin increases from 2.08 to 2.68 when labour market risk is shut down (recall
that this statistic decreases to 0.46 in the experiment eliminating labour productivity risk). For
college individuals, this statistic increases from 1.42 in the baseline economy to 2.09 when labour
market risk is eliminated (while it decreases to 0.39 in the absence of productivity risk).
Credit markets. In the baseline economy, individuals can borrow up to about 40% of average
annual earnings in the economy. Shutting down credit markets, decreases the elasticity of
aggregate labour supply from 1.75 in the baseline economy to 1.51 (see row 4 in Table 4).
The impact of credit markets on labour supply responses is almost all due to changes along
the extensive margin. These effects vary over the life cycle in important ways. Focusing on
high school individuals, the elimination of credit markets decreases the labour supply response
along the extensive margin of individuals aged 25–34 from 1.33 to 0.52, while it increases the
extensive margin elasticity of individuals aged 55–61 from 2.08 to 2.14 (Table 5). Credit markets
also have opposite effects on the labour supply responses of young and old individuals with
college education. Since young individuals hold few assets, the absence of credit makes it more
costly for young individuals to take periods off work, diminishing their labour supply responses
along the extensive margin. On the other hand, the absence of credit encourages individuals to
build precautionary savings making their employment decisions more responsive to temporary
wage shocks when old.
Non-linear earnings, ﬁxed costs of work, and extensive margin responses. We now consider
labour supply responses in three different economies. First, we consider an economy with no ﬁxed
costs of work (Fˆ=0) and linear earnings (θ =1). Since in this economy the extensive margin
is essentially inoperative, the elasticity of aggregate labour supply decreases from 1.75 to 0.84
relative to the baseline economy (see row 5 in Table 4). The decrease in the aggregate labour
supply response is all explained by a lower response along the extensive margin (from 1.08
to 0).26 Hence, in an economy with no ﬁxed costs of work and linear earnings the elasticity of
labour supply along the extensive margin is zero. To evaluate separately the role of the ﬁxed
cost of work and non-linear earnings for the observed extensive margin responses, we evaluate
employment responses when only one of these two model features is active. If we add the
calibrated ﬁxed cost of work to the economy with linear earnings, the elasticity along the extensive
margin is essentially zero (see row 7 on Table 4), suggesting that the calibrated ﬁxed cost of work
is too small for the extensive margin to respond to a small temporary wage change.27 If, instead,
we add non-linear earnings to an economy with no ﬁxed costs of work the extensive margin
elasticity is 0.57, which is a substantial response but still half of the overall response of 1.08
(compare rows 1 and 6 in Table 4). The last observations underscores that the calibrated ﬁxed
costs of work are important for employment responses in the presence of non-linear earnings.
Preference heterogeneity. To evaluate how heterogeneity in preferences affects labour supply
responses, we consider an economy in which the variance of the preference shocks is set to zero.
When preference heterogeneity is shut down in the baseline economy, the elasticity of aggregate
labour supply to a temporary wage change decreases from 1.75 to 1.29 (compare rows 1 and 8 in
Table 4)). We ﬁnd that eliminating preference heterogeneity reduces the aggregate employment
elasticity by about a half (from 1.08 to 0.58), with this reduction affecting all education and age
groups (Table 5).28 These effects are particularly large for individuals aged 25–34: the extensive
margin elasticity falls by more than a fourth for high school individuals (from 1.33 to 0.30) and
by more than a half for college individuals (from 0.64 to 0.27). Preference heterogeneity leads
to a higher employment elasticity because it allows for “lazy” types who value leisure strongly.
These individuals are much less likely to work than “non-lazy” individuals and, conditional on
working, they are much more likely to enter a non-employment spell. As a result, “lazy” types
exhibit a high employment elasticity to temporary wage changes.
In summary, the impact of modelling assumptions on labour supply responses is almost entirely
driven by their effects on decisions along the extensive margin. When we simulate employment
responses to a small wage change in an economy with linear earnings, we ﬁnd that the calibrated
ﬁxed costs of work are sufﬁciently small that, on their own, they do not affect employment
decisions along the extensive margin. However, ﬁxed costs of work matter importantly in the
presence of non-linear earnings, accounting for half of the employment response in our baseline
26. The intensive margin elasticity is higher in the economy with an inactive extensive margin due to the fact that
working hours are lower in this economy. This can be understood by recalling that ηh = 1−hh ηl , where ηh and ηl denote
the elasticity of hours and leisure, and h denotes hours of work. Since the elasticity of leisure is ﬁxed at 1/σ , a decrease
in h mechanically increases the elasticity of hours.
27. We will further discuss this issue in Section 5.4.2.
28. The only exception is for high school individuals aged 55–61, whose employment elasticity increases from
2.08 to 2.28 without preference heterogeneity.
economy. This result underscores that there is a complementarity between ﬁxed costs of work
and non-linear earnings that enhances the aggregate labour supply response to temporary wages.
The extensive margin is also crucial for understanding how the labour supply responses to
temporary wage change varies across age and education groups. The age proﬁle of the labour
supply elasticity in the baseline economy is U shaped. Modelling credit (or initial assets),
preference heterogeneity, and the extensive margin are important for generating the decline in the
elasticity early in the life cycle. If any of these features are shut down in the baseline economy,
the elasticity of labour supply does not decrease with age when individuals are young. Modelling
productivity risk and the extensive margin (non-linear earnings) are important for accounting
for the increase in the labour supply response to a temporary wage change late in the life cycle.
Preference heterogeneity increases aggregate labour supply responses, and this effect is strongest
for young individuals with high school education. Finally, labour market frictions have a large
negative effect on the labour supply response of old individuals.
Our model abstracts from human capital accumulation. It is interesting to point out that
in a model with human capital accumulation, as in Imai and Keane (2004) and Keane (2011),
the labour supply response to a temporary wage change increases over the life cycle. Young
individuals do not respond much to temporary wage shocks because the opportunity cost of work
is not only the current wage but also the return to human capital accumulation. As individuals age,
the returns to human capital accumulation decline and individuals respond more to temporary
wage changes. Our model focuses on different, but complementary, mechanisms that have similar
implications as the ones in Imai and Keane (2004). For instance, the need to build precautionary
savings makes young individuals less responsive to temporary wage changes while as they age
and accumulate assets they become more responsive.
5.1.2. Discussion. Since non-linear earnings is a relatively unexplored feature, we ﬁnd it
interesting to evaluate its role by calibrating a version of our baseline economy with linear earnings
(note that in the previous section linear earnings were introduced but without re-calibrating the
model economy). In the Online Appendix C, we compare the re-calibrated economy with linear
earnings with the baseline economy, both in terms of their ﬁt of the micro-facts as well as in
terms of their implications for aggregate labour supply responses to a temporary shock.29 In
particular, we compare the response to a one period (quadrimester) wage change of 2% across
the two calibrated model economies. We ﬁnd that the economy with linear earnings has a much
lower aggregate response than the baseline economy, with an aggregate labour supply elasticity
of 1.05 versus 1.75 in the baseline economy. The lower response in the re-calibrated economy
with linear earnings is explained by the extensive margin. In the re-calibrated economy with
linear earnings the elasticity of aggregate labour supply along the extensive margin is less than
a half the one in the baseline economy (0.44 versus 1.08). We draw two key lessons: ﬁrst, ﬁxed
costs of work may allow for signiﬁcant (bounded away from zero) extensive margin responses if
they are large enough. Secondly, non-linear earnings amplify the effect of ﬁxed costs of work on
29. We ﬁnd that the economy with linear earnings implies a worse ﬁt of the calibration targets. The most striking
difference is that the economy with linear earnings requires ﬁxed costs of work about four times higher than in the baseline
economy: for instance, focusing on high school individuals, the economy with linear earnings requires a ﬁxed cost of work
equivalent to a consumption loss of 36%, instead of the 8.5% value in the baseline economy. In the Online Appendix C,
we discuss evidence on work-related expenditures fromAguiar and Hurst (2013) suggesting that the ﬁxed costs of work in
the baseline economy are empirically more plausible. In the Online Appendix C, we also perform a sensitivity analysis by
re-calibrating the baseline economy under the assumption that the parameter σ , determining the intertemporal substitution
of leisure, is equal to three (rather than the value of two assumed in the calibration of the baseline economy). We also
compare labour supply responses to permanent (compensated) wage (tax) changes.
extensive margin responses to a temporary wage change. The baseline economy (with non-linear
earnings) has an extensive margin response to a 2% wage increase that is 2.5 times higher (e.g.
the ratio between 1.08 and 0.44 is about 2.5) than the re-calibrated economy with linear earnings
even though ﬁxed cost of work are about a factor of four smaller in the former economy.
Although restricting the analysis to 25–61 old individuals is not unusual, it does warrant
a discussion. We exclude individuals younger than 25 in order to make sure that they have
already completed their schooling. Individuals older than 61 years are excluded since at age
62 individuals can start collecting social security payments. In many ways, our model and
its computation are greatly simpliﬁed by focusing on the 25–61 age group. On the one hand,
incorporating in the analysis individuals younger than 25 would require jointly modelling the
education and labour supply decisions of young individuals, as in Keane and Wolpin (2001), for
instance. These authors also point out that a careful modelling of schooling decisions requires
explicitly accounting for heterogeneity in preferences for schooling, tuition costs, and parental
transfers. Moreover, Kaplan (2012b) argues that the fact that young people have the option to live
with their parents affects their consumption, saving, and labour supply decisions. On the other
hand, incorporating individuals older than 61 would require modelling in much greater detail the
retirement decisions and social security rules. Incorporating all these important additional aspects
in the model would add substantial complexity to the model and its computation, and as a result
we opted for concentrating on the 25–61 age group. To the extent that individuals younger than
25 are more likely to be indifferent about working at the offered wage due to the fact that they
have the option to live with their parents, as argued in Kaplan (2012b), the labour supply response
(especially at the extensive margin) would be higher than in our benchmark economy. Similarly,
we expect the labour supply responses of older individuals, collecting social security payments,
to be quantitatively more pronounced.
The empirical literature on labour supply provides a broad set of estimates for the intertemporal
elasticity of labour supply along the intensive margin. Keane (2011) surveys 21 of the best known
studies that estimate the (Frisch) elasticity of labour supply at the intensive margin and reports
a mean value from the surveyed studies of 0.83. Chetty et al. (2011a), in their meta study of
25 papers, report a mean value of 0.54 for the (intensive margin) Frisch elasticity of labour
supply. Our theory implies a value of 0.67, which is consistent with the ﬁndings in this literature.
Furthermore, we stress that the intertemporal elasticity in our model economy is computed from
an ideal experiment for which there is no clear counterpart in the data: We simulate a one period
small (purely) unanticipated wage change and compute aggregate labour supply responses to
measure the intertemporal elasticity of labour supply. If we were to measure the intertemporal
response using conventional empirical methods on the model simulated household-level data
(aggregated to the annual level), assuming no measurement error in hours and wages whatsoever,
we would have obtained a Frisch elasticity of labour supply in the range of 0.17 to 0.57, depending
on the instruments30 used in the log-hours-log-wage regression (empirical) analysis. Allowing
for some empirically reasonable measurement error in hours produces estimates in the range
of −0.79 to 0.55, which is again consistent with the estimates in the empirical literature. The
fact that the conventional empirical methods leads to estimates that are lower than the elasticity
obtained with our ideal macro-experiment is consistent with the views discussed in Keane (2011)
and Keane and Rogerson (2012).
The cross-country heterogeneity in labour supply among individuals of old age and social
security provisions present us with the opportunity to test the predictions of our theory. In
Erosa et al. (2012), we use a related framework with non-linear earnings to model in detail
30. We considered standard instruments from the literature (lagged log wage changes; or twice lagged log wage
changes; or age, age squared, and twice lagged log wage; or cubic in age). See Imai and Keane (2004) and Keane (2011).
TABLE 6
Aggregate labour supply elasticity to a permanent-compensated wage change
Total Extensive Intensive
Baseline economy 0.44 −0.11 0.55
Linear earnings 0.56 0.00 0.56
No preference heterogeneity 0.49 −0.07 0.56
the variation in the social security, disability insurance, and taxation institutions across European
countries and the U.S. We ﬁnd that the model economy accounts well for the observed cross-
country differences in labour supply late in the life cycle, indicating that the intertemporal labour
supply responses in our framework are plausible.
Our ﬁndings suggest that time aggregation is an important issue. The consensus in the
literature, to some extent, has been that the extensive margin at the annual level is not quantitatively
important for males. One contribution of our article is to show that individuals frequently use the
extensive margin to adjust their labour supply within a year, even at old ages. These extensive-
margin responses are not as prominent once we aggregate male labour supply to the annual level.
Therefore, capturing these pattern is central to the analysis in this article, and we ﬁnd that it
is essential for understanding labour supply responses. Conceptually then, a four-month model
period might also miss some higher-frequency extensive margin ﬂuctuations: individuals who
work only one or two months during a quadrimester do respond at the extensive margin, but at
the quadrimester level this will be interpreted as intensive margin ﬂuctuation in labour supply. In
order to understand whether this would lead to a higher or smaller aggregate elasticity of labour
supply, we would ideally have to formulate our theory with a smaller period—e.g. a month or a
week. Unfortunately, this is infeasible at this moment. The computational cost would simply be
enormous.31 Nonetheless, we believe that it is an important contribution of our article to show
that there are important changes along the extensive margin within a year (even if just focusing on
a quadrimester level and ignoring monthly or weekly ﬂuctuations in labour supply). Our ﬁndings
in the SIPP data show that the extensive margin is quite active at the quadrimester level. Relative
to the state of the art, we think that we have made substantial progress by looking at a four month,
instead of an annual, period.
5.2. Response to a permanent compensated wage (tax) change
In his survey of labour supply and taxes Keane (2011) argues that the Hicks elasticity measures
the behavioural response that determines the deadweight losses of taxing labour income and
thus is crucial for the optimal design of the tax system. We now evaluate the aggregate labour
supply response to a permanent compensated wage (or equivalent tax change), which provides an
estimate of the Hicks elasticity of labour supply. We simulate a permanent wage decrease of 10%
(or a an equivalent tax increase) together with a lump sum transfer that effectively compensates
the decrease in earnings due to the lower wage rate (higher tax rate). Hence, the wage (tax) change
affects the ﬁrst-order condition for working hours and earnings are only affected to the extent
31. Note that our model features many dimensions of heterogeneity (education, ﬁxed effects on labour productivity,
ﬁxed effects on taste shocks, shocks to labour productivity and shocks to preferences, life cycle), incomplete markets,
and non-convex labour supply decisions (the ﬁrst-order conditions have two interior solutions). Moreover, the calibration
requires pinning down a large number of parameters and involves a nested iterative procedure (the inner loop requires
the minimization of a loss function) which is computationally quite costly.
that individuals change hours of work. To put it differently, the compensated wage (tax) change
does not directly affects earnings but only indirectly through its impact on hours of work.
We ﬁnd that the Hicks elasticity of aggregate labour supply in the baseline economy is 0.44.32
Interestingly, labour supply responses along the intensive and extensive margins have different
signs. While the intensive margin elasticity is 0.55, the extensive margin elasticity is −0.11. Hours
along the intensive margin decrease because of the substitution effect associated with the lower
wage rate. On the other hand, the decrease in the (compensated) wage discourages savings over
the life cycle which, in turn, leads to an important increase of the employment rate at old age. This
effect accounts for the aggregate negative elasticity of labour supply along the extensive margin.
In particular, the Hicks elasticity along the extensive margin for individuals aged 55–61 is −0.42
and −0.35 for non-college and college individuals. The employment elasticity for younger age
groups is much smaller (less than one-ﬁfth the value for the oldest age group).
Our ﬁndings suggest that modelling the extensive margin is important for an accurate
assessment of aggregate labour supply responses to permanent wage (tax) changes. Neglecting
the extensive margin response will overstate the aggregate labour supply response by one-fourth.
The magnitude of this bias varies across ages and is largest for the oldest age group (by a factor
of more than 3).
We also evaluated the Hicks elasticity in two separate experiments: In the ﬁrst experiment,
we shut down non-linear earnings (relative to the baseline economy), whereas in the second
experiment we shut down preference heterogeneity. We ﬁnd that in the case with linear earnings
the aggregate Hicks elasticity is 0.56, which is higher than the 0.44 estimated for the baseline
economy. The Hicks elasticity is now higher than in the baseline economy because the extensive
margin elasticity is zero instead of negative. Shutting down preference heterogeneity also
increases the aggregate Hicks elasticity from 0.44 in the baseline economy to 0.49. The aggregate
Hicks elasticity is now slightly higher because the extensive margin elasticity decreases from
−0.11 in the baseline economy to −0.07 in the absence of preference heterogeneity. Hence,
unlike the ﬁndings for the response to a temporary wage change, preference heterogeneity does
not matter much for the Hicks elasticity of labour supply.
Finally, unlike our ﬁndings, Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) (henceforth RW) ﬁnd a positive
extensive margin elasticity with respect to a permanent (compensated) wage (tax) change. Our
model differs from RW in many dimensions. We ﬁnd it important to highlight two key factors that
account for the differences in results. First, we model the transfers that compensate workers for the
tax increase (wage decrease) in a different way than RW. While RW compensate all individuals
(regardless of whether they work or not) with a lump sum transfer that is equal to the amount of
taxes collected at each age, in our computational experiment we give back to each worker a lump
sum transfer equal to the actual increase in taxed paid (or, equivalently, a transfer that offsets the
wealth effect of the permanent wage change). This implies that in our experiment individuals that
do not work do not receive any transfer, while in the RW experiment non-working individuals do
receive transfers. As a result, not surprisingly, a larger fraction of individuals choose not to work
after a tax increase in RW than in our model. We believe that our compensation provides a more
accurate estimate of the Hicks elasticity of labour supply (e.g. given the substantial amount of
heterogeneity in our model economy, the RW transfer would have a large redistributive effect).
Our baseline experiment implies a Hicks elasticity of labour supply along the extensive margin
32. This number is consistent with the evidence summarized in Chetty et al. (2011b) and in Keane (2011).
Interestingly, however, Keane (2011) shows that in a model with human capital accumulation it is important to distinguish
between the short-run and long-run effects of a compensated permanent tax change. Since a permanent increase in taxes
decreases the incentives to accumulate human capital, the effects of such a tax reform on labour supply grow over time
and are thus higher in the long run than in the short run.
of −0.10. If we model a lump sum transfer that does not depend on whether individuals work or
not33, then the Hicks elasticity along the extensive margin rises to 0.10.
Secondly, differently from RW, our model economy features incomplete markets and
borrowing constraints. If we shut down the idiosyncratic risk in the economy (and allow
individuals to borrow up to 4 times their quadrimesterly income) we obtain that the extensive
margin elasticity rises from 0.10 to 0.26. These ﬁndings point to the fact that the extensive margin
response to a permanent tax (wage) increase (decrease) is lower with incomplete markets, such
as our baseline economy. In the presence of incomplete markets, the transfer diminishes the
incentives of individuals to build precautionary savings. The decrease in the life-cycle proﬁle of
asset holdings then encourages old individuals to work (e.g. their lower wealth discourages them
from taking periods off work). This effect mitigates the negative employment response to the
tax increase (wage decrease), and leads to the lower labour supply elasticity along the extensive
margin under incomplete markets.
5.3. The Icelandic tax experiment
We test the predictions of our theory with evidence from a tax reform that took place in Iceland.
In 1987 Iceland moved from a system under which taxes were paid on the previous year’s income
to a pay-as-you-earn system. The transition to the new tax system implied that income during
1987 was never taxed since the tax base in 1987 was income earned in 1986 and the tax base in
1988 was income earned in 1988. Chetty et al. (2011b) argued that this tax holiday induced an
unanticipated temporary wage variation that provided a natural experiment for identifying Frisch
elasticities. They simulated a one year unanticipated tax relief in the Rogerson and Wallenius
(2009) framework and concluded that the RW model implied a labour supply response much
larger (about a factor of ﬁve) than the estimated response in the data.
Our model economy is not calibrated to Iceland (and neither was the RW model). Nonetheless,
the ﬁndings of Chetty et al. (2011b) raise the concern that our theory may be at odds with the
evidence from the Icelandic Tax holiday. To evaluate this possibility, we simulate the Icelandic
tax holiday in our baseline economy. The average tax rate in Iceland was 14.5% in 1986, 0% in
1987, and 8.0% in 1988.34 In order to mimic the tax reform in Iceland, we simulate in our baseline
economy a one year (three model periods) reduction in the tax rate of 14.5 percentage points,
followed then by a permanent decrease of 6.5 percentage points in the average tax rate. Before
proceeding to the results, we want to clarify the objective of this experiment. We emphasize
that the Icelandic tax holiday does not provide evidence on Frisch elasticities of labour supply
or the aggregate labour supply response to a transitory wage change. One reason is due to the
fact that Iceland was undergoing substantial policy reforms in 1987, which were likely to affect
future growth prospects and, in particular, affect the marginal utility of wealth of the agents in
the economy. Further, as we have stated before, the 1987 tax holiday was accompanied by some
permanent tax changes after 1987. The Icelandic tax holiday thus combines a temporary tax
relief with a permanent decrease in taxes. Our goal then is to test if our theory is quantitatively
consistent with the labour supply responses in the Icelandic data.
We ﬁnd that the aggregate elasticity of labour supply implied by the Icelandic tax holiday
experiment is 0.64. Remarkably, this elasticity result is not much different from the ones estimated
33. To minimize the redistributive effect of transfers, the transfers depend on the ﬁxed characteristics of
individuals—e.g. the ﬁxed effects in labour productivity and the taste for leisure.
34. The tax change was unanticipated by households since the announcement of the policy change was made in
late 1986, see Bianchi et al. (2001).
by Bianchi et al. (2001) in the Icelandic micro-data who found an aggregate labour supply
elasticity of 0.84 for male workers.35
It is instructive to compare the labour supply response in the Icelandic tax simulation with the
one obtained when simulating a one quadrimester wage change of 2%. As we discussed earlier,
simulating the effects of a one period (quadrimester) wage increase of 2% delivers an aggregate
elasticity of labour supply equal to 1.75. (Table 4). The labour supply response is larger than the
one obtained in the Icelandic experiment (0.64) for three reasons. First, the change in wages lasts
only for one period (quadrimester) rather than three model periods (one year) and the scope for
intertemporal substitution is higher in the case of a one period wage change. Moving from a one
quadrimester to a one year wage change of 2% decreases the labour supply elasticity from 1.75
to 1.54. Secondly, the labour supply response in our model is non-linear in the size of the wage
change: the labour supply response to a one-year wage change drops from 1.54 to 0.83 when the
size of the wage change increases from 2% to 14.5% because the wealth effect is non-negligible
for large wage changes. Thirdly, the Icelandic tax experiment combines a one-year temporary
change with a permanent wage change, which further decreases the labour supply elasticity from
0.83 to 0.64.
6. CONCLUSION
We develop a life-cycle model with heterogeneous agents making labour supply decisions, both
along the intensive and extensive margins, at subannual periods. The model is consistent with
evidence from the SIPP that male individuals frequently use the extensive margin to adjust their
labour supply within a year and with the large amount of heterogeneity in lifetime labour supply
that we document using PSID data. As a result, the model provides an aggregation theory of
individual labour supply that is ﬁrmly grounded on individual-level micro-evidence and is used
to study aggregate labour supply responses. We ﬁnd that the aggregate labour supply elasticity to
a transitory wage shock is 1.75, with the extensive margin accounting for 62% of the response.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the aggregate labour supply elasticity to a permanent-compensated
wage change is 0.44.
Our results provide insights for both business cycle and policy analysis. Modelling an operative
extensive margin (within a year) is crucial for understanding labour supply responses of men. In
the absence of an extensive margin, the response to a small one period wage shock (intertemporal
elasticity of aggregate labour supply) would be underestimated by more than a half (0.67 instead
of 1.75). The extensive margin response in our baseline economy is enhanced because of the
interaction between ﬁxed costs of work and non-linear earnings. In the absence of any of these
two features, extensive margin responses are cut by more than a half. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the
age proﬁle of the labour supply responses to temporary wage changes in our model economy is
U shaped, which suggests that the ingredients in our model (such as preference heterogeneity
and extensive margin) may be important in accounting for the fact that over the business cycle
hours of work and employment ﬂuctuate much more for young and old individuals than for the
middle aged. Hence, in future work it would be interesting to embed our model in a business
cycle framework.
35. This value comes from adding the extensive and intensive margin elasticities. They report an extensive margin
elasticity of 0.58 in Table 4 in Bianchi et al. (2001). The intensive margin elasticity of 0.26 is obtained using data from
Table 6. In our simulations, the response along the extensive margin is 0.23, which is substantially smaller than the
0.58 value reported by Bianchi et al. (2001). However, we should note that these authors used data on number of weeks
worked to measure the extensive margin response. Since our model period is a quadrimester, our higher response along
the intensive margin is probably capturing an extensive margin response in the data studied by Bianchi et al. (2001). We
thus think that it is more appropriate to focus our analysis on aggregate labour supply responses.
We believe that our framework contains crucial ingredients for studying how tax and transfers
institutions across countries affect aggregate labour supply. When the extensive margin is active,
the effects of taxes on labour supply are non-linear in the size of the tax rates and these non-
linearities may vary across individuals with different characteristics, such as age, education, and
taste for leisure. Responses along the extensive margin have the potential of being large among
those groups of individuals that have a low employment rate, but nonetheless they could be small
if the tax changes are small and individuals’(after-tax) wages are far from their reservation values.
Moreover, labour supply responses depend importantly on how the tax revenue is rebated back
to consumers. Hence, to accurately assess the impact of taxes on labour supply, we believe that it
is important to incorporate an active extensive margin, preference heterogeneity, and model the
institutions determining how transfers are made to individuals. These features should also matter
for the design of optimal tax policies and income support policies. These issues are left for future
research.
Our theory emphasizes the importance of variations in the extensive margin, at the
quadrimester level (four-month period), for understanding male labour supply. A four-month
model period might also miss some higher-frequency extensive margin ﬂuctuations: individuals
who work only one or two months during a quadrimester do respond at the extensive margin, but
at the quadrimester level these responses will be interpreted as intensive margin ﬂuctuations in
labour supply. In order to understand whether this would lead to a higher or smaller aggregate
elasticity of labour supply, we would ideally have to formulate our theory with a smaller period—
e.g. a month or a week. Unfortunately, the computational costs are too high at this moment, but
we think that we have made an important contribution by assessing the importance of changes
along the extensive margin within a year.
The insights in our article should also be quite relevant for the study of female labour supply,
and extending the model to include female labour supply will enhance our understanding of
aggregate labour supply responses. Finally, incorporating a household structure in the analysis in
which both spouses make joint labour supply decisions would enhance our understanding of the
determinants of labour supply responses and would allow for the realistic inclusion of various
government policies and transfers such as Food Stamps and the Earned Income Tax Credit.
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